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CHANGING ROLE OF MEXICAN ACCOUNTING FIRMS AND OF
THE COMISARIO, AND RESPONSE TO SARBANES-OXLEY
LIC. JOSi 0. GARCIA MATA*
In different degrees the world securities markets are facing crises of confidence.
Much has been said and written on the alleged underlying causes of the problem:
flagrant misuse and abuse of accounting policies, dishonesty of Wall Street, top
management's use of corporate assets as personal piggy banks. No doubt these
reasons have contributed to the crisis of confidence in the United States securities
market. I maintain, however, that those sins would have been forgiven had the
exuberant market not turned into a blue market. Thus the shattered dreams of
millions of Americans, who banked on illusory net worth that would have meant
earlier and more comfortable retirements, constitute one of the overriding causes of
the crisis of confidence in the U.S. market. Fortunately, in Mexico we have few
friends and neighbors who suffered the consequences of the U.S. stock market
bubble burst.
Accounting scandals and auditors have borne the biggest share of the blame for
the erosion of confidence in the markets. Undeniably, auditors' incompetence and
unethical behavior as well as ineffective audit methodologies helped fuel the
insatiable quest of top management in some companies for an ever-increasing
bottom line and unstoppable growth. We cannot seriously believe that an
accounting entry on the books of WorldCom drove it into Chapter 11. Clearly, the
business models of Enron, Tyco, Vivendi and WorldCom were not meant to survive
untouched in the down cycles of a real economy. Arthur Andersen's demise was a
very high price to pay for the errors of a few. The accounting profession must
capitalize this cost and ensure that its members discharge their professional
responsibility with the highest sense of ethics and independence.
Mexico, an important participant in the regional and global economies, is not
immune to the side effects of the medicine being administered to attempt to cure the
ills of the U.S. crisis of confidence. The most potent remedy, the hastily conceived
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,' affects many companies operating outside the U.S. and has
permeated the regulatory environments of many countries. Mexico's securities
regulatory agency, the Comisi6nNacionalBancariay de Valores (National Banking

and Securities Commission), or CNBV, has issued rules that replicate some of the
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, although they fall short by not requiring internal
control certifications by top management. Except for the deferral of its effective date
to 2005 and not requiring quarterly certifications and other minor concessions,
Sarbanes-Oxley will apply to Mexican and other foreign private issuers--companies
whose securities are traded in the U.S. markets. The following chart is a comparison
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of the requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and the rules recently issued by the National
Banking and Securities Commission:
COMPARISON BETWEEN CNBV REGULATIONS AND SARBANES-OXLEY
REQUIREMENTS

1. CFO and CEO certifications
* Internal and disclosure controls
0 Annual assessment of effectiveness and monitoring of IC
0 Independent auditor attestation
2. Auditor independence
3. Prohibited services
4. Audit partner rotation
5. Appointment of auditor
6. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
7. Directors' independence
o. Audit Committee

CNBV

SO

no
no
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

yes

yes

As can be seen, the Mexican regulations do not require internal control
certifications or the establishment of an oversight body. I believe that the internal
control certifications, although they impose an enormous personal responsibility on
public companies' top management, are the single most important measure that will
help restore confidence in the business environment as a whole and the stock
markets in particular. Internal control on financial reporting certifications will
enhance the reliability and transparency of financial statements, promote ethical
business practices, and hold top management accountable for material information
emanating from accounting and information systems.
In response to initiatives from the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, the CNBV has asked the Mexican Institute of Public Accountants to
propose an operating mechanism for an accounting oversight body, which would be
partially or fully financed by large firms. I believe that in our circumstances, this is
a move in the right direction, inasmuch as the establishment of a board similar to the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board' would require unavailable resources
needed to attract the required talents to conduct a professional and fair oversight
function. The Institute must ensure that its recommendation will consider
independence as the bedrock of its proposal.
The auditor independence rules are similar to the S arbanes-Oxley provisions. The
Mexican regulations established the concept of prohibited services such as
bookkeeping, information systems implementation and management, internal audit
and legal services, management participation, valuation and appraisal services and
executive recruiting, in addition to the basic prohibition against making investments

2. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is a private, non-profit corporation. It was created
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to protect the interests of investors by overseeing the preparation of audit reports of
public companies.
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in the audited entities. The regulation also requires the rotation of audit partners
every five years, with a two-year "time-out" period, the appointment of auditors
based on the favorable recommendation of the audit committee, and the preapproval of non-audit services.
Given the economic and banking crises of the mid 1990's, the Mexican private
sector appointed a blue ribbon committee with the mandate to formulate a code of
best corporate practices that would ensure good corporate governance in public and
private companies. The result was a comprehensive document that anticipated the
need to establish many of the rules that have been recently promulgated around the
world. In 2000, the CNBV exhorted public companies to voluntarily adopt the 56
recommendations of the Best Corporate Practices Code and required formal
reporting of the degree of adherence to the recommendations. 3 Following are several
tables showing the extent to which public companies have adopted the
recommendations:
RECOMMENDATIONS - APPLICATION IS NOT MANDATORY

" Board of Directors
-Make up, structure, operation, and directors' duties
" Board of Directors' Committees
-Performance evaluation and compensation of top management
-Audit
-Finance and planning
" Information
-Disclosure to shareholders
Adoption of BCPC Recommendations

% Issuers
2000

2001

2002

49

56

61

"operation - minimum attendance, etc.

80

84

88

• directors' duties - conflicts of interest, etc.

87

88

88

46

47

49

" audit

68

76

80

" finance and planning

64

63

61

3. Information - disclosure to shareholders

60

67

73

1. Board of Directors
e make up - 5 to 15 members, independent
directors, etc

2. Board of directors' committees (structure)
- performance evaluation and compensation of
top management

3. C.N.B.V., C6digo deMejores PrdcticasCorporativas,(July I999),othttp:/www.cnbv.gb.mx/notcia
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2000
26
41

% Issuers
2001
58
59

2002
70
66

Evaluates and opines on effectiveness on internal
control

48

65

71

Ascertains that interim and annual financial
information is prepared using consistent

55

76

77

Audit Conmittees
Chaired by an independent director
Approves accounting policies and submits to
board for approval

accounting policies

% Issuers

Independent Auditors
2000

2001

2002

Audit partner rotation every 6 years

72

81

84

Independent auditor "validates" and opines on
effectiveness of internal control

90

91

87

Auditor partner different from Comisario

67

75

78

As mentioned above, most of the BCPC recommendations are not mandatory and
their adoption is largely unsupervised. Also, there is little guidance on what
documentation must be generated to support reported adherence. Thus, in many
cases the reported adoption is based on subjective management interpretations. A
clear example is the reported independent auditors' "validation" and their opinion
on the effectiveness of internal control. The reported adoption of this
recommendation is based on management's erroneous inference that the auditor's
annual letter of recommendations that includes suggestions to improve internal
controls represents an opinion on the effectiveness of internal control. To the
surprise of many, a financial statement audit is not designed to identify significant
deficiencies or material weakness in internal control.
One of the BCPC recommendations which, in my personal view, constitutes gross
misguidance is the suggestion that the comisario (statutory auditor-examiner) be
different from the partner responsible for the audit of a company's financial
statements. The comisario requirement is an anachronistic concept that imposes
significant personal responsibility, and, in my opinion, no reasonably prudent person
should accept this largely honorary position without the support of and personal
involvement in the audit of a corporation's financial statements. Several comisarios
have been personally sued for supposedly committing criminal acts.
The Mexican General Corporate Law establishes that one or several comisarios
will be in charge of overseeing the corporation. According to the law the comisario
has two principal duties. The first principal duty is to submit to the general
shareholders' meeting an annual opinion on whether the policies, and accounting
and information criteria followed by the corporation are adequate and sufficient
taking into consideration the particular circumstances of the corporation, and
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whether the policies and criteria have been applied consistently, and consequently,
the information presented by management to the shareholders, reflects in a true and
sufficient form, the financial position and results of operations of the corporation.
The second principal duty holds the comisario individually responsible to the
corporation for the compliance with the obligations established by the law.
In closing, I would like to touch on the need of Mexican public companies to
implement strict corporate governance practices to offset the perception that closely
controlled companies have overriding managements and boards of directors which
remain exclusively an Old Boys' Club.
Mexican public companies, particularly those whose securities are traded in the
U.S. markets, must think about corporate governance in a whole new way. They
must upgrade internal controls on financial reporting and strengthen audit committee
accountability. Truly independent recognized professionals must be appointed to
boards of directors, professionals who will not hesitate to take a principled stance
and confront management on questionable decisions.

